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Abstract. In this lecture, I argue that there are remarkable parallels between
how monetary and ﬁscal policies operate on the macro economy and that these
parallels are suﬃcient to lead us to think about transforming ﬁscal policy and ﬁs-
cal institutions as many countries have transformed monetary policy and monetary
institutions. Making ﬁscal transparency comparable to monetary transparency re-
quires ﬁscal authorities to discuss future possible ﬁscal policies explicitly. Enhanced
ﬁscal transparency can help anchor expectations of ﬁscal policy and make ﬁscal ac-
tions more predictable and eﬀective. As advanced economies move into a prolonged
period of heightened ﬁscal activity, anchoring ﬁscal expectations will become an
increasingly important aspect of macroeconomic policy.
1. Introduction
A stunning transformation in monetary policy has occurred in the past 15 years.
Central banks have moved from “monetary mystique” to a “culture of clarity,” a
movement in which the Reserve Bank of New Zealand has led the way. It is now
widely accepted that for monetary policy to eﬀectively stabilize the real economy and
inﬂation, it should be guided by several principles: monetary policy should be inde-
pendent of ﬁscal policy, insulated from political pressures, and avoid fooling people in
order to oﬀset the dynamic eﬀects of distortions in the economy; in addition, central
bankers should communicate transparently about their objectives and their strategies
for achieving those objectives and they should be held accountable for their decisions.
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There is less widespread agreement about the position taken by some central banks
to take transparency to the next level by announcing the governors’ own views about
the likely future path of the policy interest rate.
1
Still more remarkable is that this transformation occurred in the absence of any
real evidence that transparency of monetary policy and improved communication by
central banks actually matter for the performance of the economy.
2 Two conditions
drove the move toward greater transparency. First, a professional consensus emerged
that inﬂation is a monetary phenomenon and that inﬂation control is the appropriate
purview of the central bank. Second, and perhaps more important, a political consen-
sus developed that low and stable inﬂation is desirable because inﬂation ﬂuctuations
redistribute wealth in capricious ways [Faust and Henderson (2004)]. It took several
decades of poor macroeconomic performance for these consensuses to develop.
Why have we seen no corresponding enlightenment in governments’ tax and spend-
ing policies? Despite a range of changes in ﬁscal frameworks across advanced countries
since the 1990s, in general, ﬁscal policy remains as opaque as ever. Is it desirable
to transform ﬁscal policy in a manner that is analogous to what has occurred with
monetary policy? Is it feasible? Can professional and political consensuses on the
eﬀects and role of ﬁscal policies be reached?
Monetary authorities and ﬁscal authorities appear to mean diﬀerent things by
“transparency.” For central banks it is a means to an end: the better the public
understands and anticipates monetary policy choices, the more ﬁrmly expectations
will be anchored on actual monetary policy goals, and the more eﬀective monetary
policy will be in achieving its objectives. This is the sense in which I shall use
the term. But this is not how ﬁscal authorities apply the term. In ﬁscal realms,
“transparency” means the adoption of generally accepted accounting principles, the
conduct of policy in an open and public way, and so forth. Fiscal transparency is more
about establishing the integrity of the ﬁscal process than it is about helping the public
to form expectations of future tax and spending policies. Although ﬁscal authorities
compute and publish ﬁscal projections, the projections typically condition on current
policies; they are silent on possible future policies and, therefore, contribute little to
transparency and the anchoring of ﬁscal expectations.
This lecture will argue that there are strong parallels between how monetary and
ﬁscal policies aﬀect private-sector behavior and what the two kinds of policies can
achieve in the macro economy. Along many important dimensions monetary and
ﬁscal policies have more similarities than dissimilarities. As a consequence, the ar-
guments that have led countries to make dramatic reforms to their monetary policy
1Faust and Leeper (2005) discuss these issues in more detail in the context of monetary policy.
2There is now evidence supporting the earlier presumption [see Blinder, Ehrmann, Fratzscher,
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institutions apply with equal—or possibly greater—force to ﬁscal policy. Because ﬁs-
cal policy actions typically generate changes in government debt, taxes, and spending
that extend over several decades, in practice, dynamics may be more important for
ﬁscal policy than for monetary policy [Chung and Leeper (2007), Leeper, Plante, and
Traum (2009)].
This fact has not been fully embraced by institutional reformers.
3 Instead, ﬁs-
cal reforms are often superﬁcial and frequently ineﬀectual when compared to the
thorough-going reformations of monetary policy in many countries. I will argue that
this asymmetric treatment of monetary and ﬁscal policies runs the risk of undermining
the progress made in monetary policy. I will also argue that, because ﬁscal policy in
many countries is likely to raise substantial economic and political challenges over the
next several decades, ﬁscal transparency and the anchoring of ﬁscal expectations will
become increasingly important aspects of macroeconomic policy. Eﬀective reforms
may require statutory or constitutional enforcement that give the reforms bite.
Inconsistencies between monetary and ﬁscal policy frameworks are most likely to
become apparent in times of economic stress. The current ﬁnancial turmoil and
worldwide recession may provide a challenging test to the monetary-only reforms.
2. Fiscal Failure Breeds Monetary Success
2.1. Fiscal Roots of Extreme Crises. History abounds with examples where badly
managed ﬁscal policies undermined the ability of monetary policy to achieve its
macroeconomic objectives. Even observers who subscribe to the adage that “in-
ﬂation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon,” acknowledge that it is
“almost always” and “nearly everywhere.” Hyperinﬂation is the classic exception—
presumably the one that makes the rule—of an inﬂation whose fundamental cause is
ﬁscal policy run amok.
The best-known hyperinﬂation occurred between the world wars in Europe. After
World War I, Germany was under tremendous ﬁscal strain: the Versailles Treaty
entailed substantial reparation payments from Germany to France and England; the
German government was trying to rebuild an economy destroyed by war; the destroyed
economy created an extraordinarily weak tax base, making it impossible to collect
suﬃcient revenues to cover expenditures. Government budget deﬁcits were large,
with revenues never covering more than about 35 percent of expenditures. Running
the printing presses was the only ﬁscal option available to the government, with the
predictable results. Between July and November of 1923, the inﬂation rate was 560
3Although many treasuries or other ﬁscal agencies are required to construct long-term projections,
for reasons discussed below, these projections do not adequately reﬂect the dynamics of ﬁscal policies;
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billion percent. Figure 1 records the overall price level in Germany from 1919 to 1924,
using a logarithmic scale. During this period, the price level increased several trillion
fold.
4
Germany’s hyperinﬂation led after World War II to the Bundesbank’s singular
success in controlling inﬂation. Germany’s Bundesbank was widely regarded as the
world’s foremost inﬂation ﬁghter, even during the 1970s when many countries expe-
rienced a steady upward march in inﬂation rates. Even now hyperinﬂation’s legacy
looms large over European monetary policy: European Monetary Union, with Ger-
many as a central player, is designed to carry the legacy of the horrors of hyperinﬂation
into policy decisions of the European Central Bank.
Latin American countries are well known for having high inﬂation or periodic bouts
of hyperinﬂations in which ﬁscal policies have played a central role [Singh, Belaisch,
Collyns, De Masi, Krieger, Meredith, and Rennhack (2005)]. Some examples of peak
inﬂation rates are: Bolivia, May to August 1985, 60,000 percent [Sachs (1987)]; Ar-
gentina, May 1989 to March 1990, 20,266 percent [Reinhart and Savastano (2003)];
Peru, July to August 1990, 12,378 percent [Reinhart and Savastano (2003)]. Chile be-
came the world’s second inﬂation targeting country when it transformed its monetary
policy in September 1990. Five other Latin American countries—Brazil, Columbia,
Mexico, and Peru—now oﬃcially target inﬂation [Vega and Winkelried (2005)]. Sev-
eral of these countries, and Chile in particular, backed up their monetary reforms
with dramatic ﬁscal reforms.
2.2. Fiscal Role in Moderate Crises. Sweden and New Zealand are instruc-
tive examples of countries that experienced moderate—judged by the standards of
hyperinﬂations—economic crises to which the macroeconomic policy response was
reform of both monetary and ﬁscal institutions. Both countries also underwent ex-
tensive deregulation of ﬁnancial markets immediately preceding the macroeconomic
reforms. Although both countries did adopt ﬁscal reforms, those reforms were not
nearly as through-going as the monetary changes, which were wholesale reforms of
the objectives and the execution of monetary policy.
2.2.1. Sweden. In the early 1990s Sweden experienced a boom-bust cycle that se-
verely tested the prevailing monetary-ﬁscal policy regime.
5 After deregulation of the
ﬁnancial system, the economy boomed in the late 1980s, with rapid growth in GDP,
4Of course, along with the massive inﬂation came large distortions to the real economy and the
associated output losses. Sargent (1986) describes several other historical episodes of hyperinﬂation
at the same time—Austria, Hungary, and Poland—tracing each to large-scale ﬁscal failures.
5This section draws liberally from Swedish Ministry of Finance (2001), Jonung (2009), and Wet-
terberg (2009).ANCHORING FISCAL EXPECTATIONS 5
employment, consumption, and imports. Despite a worsening current account bal-
ance, monetary policy was prevented from reacting to the boom because the krona
was pegged to a basket of currencies.
By 1989-1990 the boom had ended and the bust began. Rising international real
interest rates exerted further pressure on the pegged krona while simultaneously the
Riksbank raised nominal interest rates to defend the krona against speculative attacks.
Major tax reform in 1990-1991 sharply lowered marginal tax rates and reduced mort-
gage deductibility, raising real after-tax interest rates still more. The strong increases
in real rates deﬂated asset values, which reduced wealth and triggered a banking
crisis.
The resulting recession was comparable to Sweden’s experience in the Great De-
pression. GDP fell for three consecutive years. Unemployment rose from 1.5 percent
in 1989 to over 8 percent in 1993. The cumulative employment loss exceeded that
of the Great Depression, according to Jonung (2009). Attacks on the krona contin-
ued, culminating in the famous instance on September 16, 1992 when the Riksbank
raised the overnight rate to 500 percent.
6 In the event, by November 19 the Riksbank
allowed the krona to ﬂoat.
Large automatic stabilizers built into Swedish ﬁscal rules swung the general gov-
ernment balance from a 5 percent surplus in 1989 to nearly a 12 percent deﬁcit in
1993.
7 Central government debt rose from 30 percent to 80 percent of GDP over the
same period.
The Swedish government responded with a thorough reform of both monetary
and ﬁscal policy. Beginning in January 1993, the Riksbank announced a 2 percent
target for CPI inﬂation, applying from 1995 on. This target was formalized by the
Sveriges Riksbank Act, passed in 1997, an act that greatly reinforced the Riksbank’s
independence [Sveriges Riksbank (2008)]. Fiscal policy in 1993 consolidated in ﬁts
and starts, but projections showed government debt continuing to grow rapidly and
fears of sustainability arose. Progress on ﬁscal reform was motivated by at least three
concerns. First, bond markets downgraded Swedish sovereign debt in 1993. Second,
by the end of 1993 one-third of government expenditures were devoted to debt service.
Third, it was recognized that ﬁscal instability could undermine the Riksbank’s newly
adopted inﬂation targeting regime. A series of bills beginning in late 1994, called the
“Consolidation Programme,” sought to stabilize debt by adopting both a nominal
expenditures ceiling and a surplus target. By 1998 the budget had swung back to
surplus and debt was on a downward trajectory.
6The Riksbank had plans to go as high as 4000 percent [Swedish Ministry of Finance (2001)].
7Sweden is known for having unusually strong automatic stabilizers [Floden (2009), Calmfors
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Jonung (2009) lists macroeconomic policy reforms as critical factors in resolving
crises in both the ﬁnancial sector and the real economy. Swedish policies continue to
be guided by the reforms that grew out of the crises.
2.2.2. New Zealand. After a decade of poor economic performance, in July 1984 New
Zealand launched comprehensive economic reforms that transformed the country’s
economic landscape. Over the previous decade, government debt had increased six-
fold, inﬂation rates were chronically in the double digits, and the unemployment rate
had risen from 0.2 percent to 4.9 percent.
Reforms were broad and deep. They included privatization and deregulation of
industries, ﬁnancial and trade liberalization, reform of public ﬁnance, and deregu-
lation of labor markets [Evans, Grimes, Wilkinson, and Teece (1996)]. In terms of
macroeconomic policies, the critical changes were the decision to allow the Kiwi dollar
to ﬂoat on March 4, 1985, the passage of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand Act in
December 1989, and the Fiscal Responsibility Act in 1994.
New Zealand led the way in reform of its monetary policy.
8 Although at the time
other central banks were operating with considerable autonomy—for example, the
German Bundesbank, the Swiss National Bank, and the U.S. Federal Reserve—the
Reserve Bank Act was the ﬁrst to establish that the central bank’s primary function
was “achieving and maintaining stability in the general level of prices.” The Act also
required the Governor of the RBNZ and the Minister of Finance to negotiate a Policy
Targets Agreement (PTA), which laid out speciﬁc targets—in practice, an inﬂation
target—that the Bank would aim to hit. Transparency was served by publicly an-
nouncing the PTA. Accountability was addressed by making the Governor’s contract
conditional on achieving the agreed upon targets; in principle the Governor could be
dismissed or not renewed for failing to attain the targets. The Reserve Bank Act and
its implementation were bold initiatives that began the worldwide movement toward
inﬂation targeting, the monetary policy regime now adopted by more than 20 central
banks.
As in Sweden, ﬁscal reforms in New Zealand progressed more gradually. In the
decade from the early 1980s, New Zealand sovereign debt was downgraded three times,
from AAA to AA−. Estimates of default and liquidity premia on its debt ranged from
about 125 basis points in 1990 to 75 basis points in 1994 [Hawkesby, Smith, and Tether
(2000)] when the debt-GDP ratio had climbed to over 50 percent. Just as monetary
policy became focused on a single objective—inﬂation targeting—ﬁscal reforms were
designed “to provide stable policies rather than stabilization policies,” as (Evans,
Grimes, Wilkinson, and Teece, 1996, p. 1863) put it.
8Lloyd (1992) provides a nice overview.ANCHORING FISCAL EXPECTATIONS 7
Fiscal reforms culminated in the Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1994, which shifted
focus from short-run economic and political issues to strategic and long-run objectives
[Scott (1995)]. Out of the Act grew enhanced transparency in the form of detailed
accounts and long-run projections, which are made public. It also mandates that
sovereign debt levels should be at “prudent levels,” a mandate that is now interpreted
as an informal debt target of 20 percent of GDP, a level that presumably will ensure
that New Zealand sovereign debt is not assessed a substantial default premium.
2.3. Summary. Many countries, in addition to Sweden and New Zealand, trans-
formed their monetary policies, adopting either explicit or de facto inﬂation targeting.
Advocates of the monetary policy transformation point to data like those depicted in
ﬁgures 2 and 3 as evidence that the monetary transformation has been highly suc-
cessful. Both the average level and the volatility of inﬂation across countries have
declined markedly over the past 20 years [ﬁgure 2]. And the success with inﬂation
begat less variation in output growth in those same countries, a phenomenon that
has been labeled, perhaps immoderately, “the great moderation” [ﬁgure 3].
Those advocates attribute these two striking successes entirely to monetary policy
reforms that have delivered better policies. But for many countries whose data appear
in those ﬁgures, the years from the mid-1980s to 2007 were particularly benign, with
only mild recessions and no large and persistent adverse economic shocks.9
Benign, that is, until now. The current global recession and ﬁnancial crisis are
testing the view that monetary policy alone can deliver good economic performance.
3. Parallels Between Monetary and Fiscal Policies
Despite the willingness of economists to concede that ﬁscal policy may drive inﬂa-
tion in extreme circumstances, such as hyperinﬂations, those same economists hold
fast to the view that “normally” monetary policy alone can control inﬂation, if only
central bankers have suﬃcient resolve. I now develop the argument that in the realm
of inﬂation control, as well as other matters, it is generically true that it is the joint
behavior of monetary and ﬁscal policy that matters, even in normal times.
Classic writings about macroeconomic policies recognized the inherent symmetry
between monetary and ﬁscal policies. For example, Friedman’s sweeping policy pre-
scriptions treated the two branches of macroeconomic policy equally [Friedman (1948,
1960)]. In later years, when Friedman began to discuss monetary policy exclusively,
his critics shot back that ﬁscal policy and government liabilities, such as debt, needed
9In this same set of countries, New Zealand stands out as the exception, with the recession in the
early 1990s producing large negative growth rates in GDP.ANCHORING FISCAL EXPECTATIONS 8
to be brought in as equal partners with monetary policy and money [Brunner and
Meltzer (1974, 1972), Tobin (1974, 1980), Tobin and Buiter (1976)].
The profound inﬂuence of Friedman’s later work is apparent even today. Leading
graduate textbooks in monetary economics by Walsh (2003), Woodford (2003), and
Gali (2008) discuss monetary policy in tremendous detail with only scant, if any,
reference to ﬁscal policy, and then only to acknowledge that the book’s maintained
assumptions serve to trivialize ﬁscal policy. Walsh (2003) does contain some discus-
sion of ﬁscal theories of the price level, but treats them as a distinct perspectives on
macro policy, rather than as an integral part of a comprehensive view of price level
determination. The bulk of the book, however, examines monetary policy in isola-
tion from ﬁscal policy. Discussions by leading monetary economists about monetary
frameworks and inﬂation targeting rarely, if ever, mention ﬁscal policy [Bernanke
and Mishkin (1997), Bernanke, Laubach, Mishkin, and Posen (1999), Rotemberg and
Woodford (1999), Svensson (1999), Taylor (1999), Goodfriend (2005)]. Econometric
models estimated at central banks typically treat ﬁscal policy in only the most per-
functory manner, if they include it at all [Brayton and Tinsley (1996), Smets and
Wouters (2003, 2007), Harrison, Nikolov, Quinn, Ramsey, Scott, and Thomas (2005),
Adolfson, Laseen, Linde, and Villani (2007)].10
I will take the position that, despite the established tradition of treating monetary
policy separately from ﬁscal policy, there are remarkable parallels between how mon-
etary and ﬁscal policies operate on the macro economy and that these parallels are
suﬃcient to lead us to think about transforming ﬁscal policy and ﬁscal institutions as
many countries have transformed monetary policy and monetary institutions. Indeed,
it makes little sense to reform monetary policy independently of ﬁscal policy.
Four important parallels stand out: macroeconomics impacts, the centrality of
expectations for policy eﬀects, ensuring government solvency, and the importance
of transparency and credibility for policy eﬀectiveness. In what follows, I focus on
ﬁscal policy because much has already been written about these issues with regard
to monetary policy.
3.1. Macroeconomic Impacts. Both monetary and ﬁscal policies can inﬂuence real
economic activity and control inﬂation, and both do so with, in Friedman’s (1961)
famous phrase, “long and variable lags.” That changes in tax distortions and gov-
ernment purchases can have important eﬀects on the real economy is widely ac-
cepted. Empirical evidence suggests that for a variety of reasons, even changes in
non-distorting taxes and transfers have real eﬀects.
10The International Monetary Fund’s “Global Integrated Monetary Fiscal Model” is an important
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Fiscal policies play an important countercyclical role in many countries. Automatic
stabilizers are built into tax codes and expenditure programs that ensure that during
economic downturns tax burdens decline while government transfers increase, with
the aim of cushioning individuals against declines in their incomes. In Sweden, for
example, automatic stabilizers are large and have been relied on as nearly the sole
source of countercyclical policies during the 2007-2009 recession [Floden (2009), Borg
(2009)]. “Discretionary” policies, which require legislative action, are a form of coun-
tercyclical response that has played a major role in the current recession [examples of
recent ﬁscal initiatives appear in Romer and Bernstein (2009), HM Treasury (2009a),
Australian Treasury (2009), and New Zealand Treasury (2009)].
Less well appreciated, and less studied, are the impacts of ﬁscal policy on inﬂation.
Recent research under the rubric of the “ﬁscal theory of the price level” argues that
under certain assumptions about monetary and ﬁscal policy behavior, it is ﬁscal
policy, rather than monetary policy, that determines the price level and the rate of
inﬂation.11
At its most basic level, the ﬁscal theory brings to the foreground the role of an
intertemporal equilibrium condition that in most monetary-only analyses of inﬂation
is swept into deep background. This equilibrium condition, which equates the value of
outstanding government liabilities—money plus bonds—to the expected present value
of net-of-interest ﬁscal surpluses inclusive of seigniorage revenues, is ubiquitous in
formal economic models and intrinsic to thinking about policy in dynamic economies.
Schematically, the intertemporal equilibrium condition (IEC) is expressed as
Market Value of Liabilities =
Expected Present Value of Future Net Surpluses (IEC)
where
Net Surpluses = Total Revenues + Central Bank Seigniorage
− Government Consumption & Investment − Government Transfer Payments
Importantly, the expected present value of surpluses reﬂects the beliefs that holders
of government liabilities have about the entire future paths of the policy variables
that constitute net surpluses.
It is natural to interpret expression (IEC) as a valuation formula for liabilities
[Cochrane (1999)]. Government liabilities derive their value from their anticipated
backing. That backing comes from the government’s ability to raises revenues through
direct taxes or through inﬂation taxes, as well as the ability to reduce spending
obligations.
11These papers include Leeper (1991), Sims (1994), Woodford (1995, 2001a), Cochrane (1999),
Gordon and Leeper (2006), and Leeper and Yun (2006), among many others.ANCHORING FISCAL EXPECTATIONS 10
Following an economic disturbance that perturbs the equality in the (IEC), equi-
librium can be reestablished through some combination of adjustments in the value of
the liabilities—prices of bonds or the general price level—or in expected surpluses.12
Stark forms of monetary or ﬁscal theories of price level determination are distinguished
by assumptions about how equality of the (IEC) is achieved.
Monetary theories assume adjustment occurs primarily through surpluses, typically
in some non-distorting way, such as via lump-sum taxes. In this manner, monetary
policy is free to determine the price level—as it does in characterizations of inﬂation
targeting central banks—and thereby the value of government liabilities. Fiscal policy
is relegated to a supporting role, as it is required to adjust future surpluses suﬃciently
to ensure the (IEC) holds. This monetary-ﬁscal policy regime is variously referred
to as “monetary dominance” [Sargent (1982)], “monetarist/Ricardian” [Aiyagari and
Gertler (1985)], or “active monetary/passive ﬁscal policy” [Leeper (1991)]. Of course,
ﬁscal policy’s supporting role is essential for monetary policy to be able to control
inﬂation. If ﬁscal policy is unwilling or unable to provide appropriate support, mon-
etary policy will lose control of inﬂation, a point that has been forcefully made by
Sims (2005) in the context of inﬂation targeting and by Cochrane (2009) in reference
to current macro policies.
Fiscal theories posit that surpluses do not systematically adjust to establish the
(IEC), so adjustment must occur through the market value of liabilities. Because lia-
bilities are denominated in nominal, or dollar, terms, changes in the price level alter
their real value: a higher price level reduces their value and requires less backing from
future surpluses. Alternatively, when government bonds have long maturities, their
prices can adjust, which change long-term interest rates and, therefore, expected in-
ﬂation [Cochrane (2001)]. Now monetary policy plays the supporting role by allowing
to occur the ﬂuctuations in the inﬂation rate that are needed to stabilize debt. The
policy regime underlying the ﬁscal perspective is called “ﬁscal dominance,” “non-
Ricardian,” or “passive monetary/active ﬁscal policy.”13 Symmetrically, if monetary
policy fails to provide support, then ﬁscal policy cannot control the price level.
Two striking conclusions emerge from the ﬁscal theory: newly issued nominal gov-
ernment debt is inﬂationary and increases in nominal interest rates induced by mone-
tary policy behavior raise rather than lower inﬂation. Sims (2008) nicely summarizes
the mechanisms at work:
12Of course, the discount rate can also play a role in the adjustment process, as empirical work
seems to suggest [Chung and Leeper (2007), Leeper, Plante, and Traum (2009)].
13There is evidence that macroeconomic policies in some countries have been consistent with
the ﬁscal theory equilibrium [Cochrane (1999), Sims (2001, 2008), and Woodford (2001a)]. Davig
and Leeper (2006, 2009) pursue the plausible idea that monetary and ﬁscal regimes ﬂuctuate over
time, bouncing among mixes of the two policies, according to estimates of policy behavior. In that
environment, the ﬁscal mechanisms are always at work.ANCHORING FISCAL EXPECTATIONS 11
“Increases in nominal debt in the hands of the public that are not ac-
companied by any increase in expected future tax liabilities or by any
increase in the price level leave the public with apparently increased
wealth, which they will try to spend, until price increases erode their
wealth or expectations about future taxes or economic growth make
them scale back spending. In these circumstances, an increased nom-
inal interest rate ﬂows directly through to increased nominal govern-
ment spending. In a ﬂexible price model, the monetary authority loses
any ability to aﬀect the price level, as interest rate increases increase
the rate of expansion of nominal government debt without any restric-
tive eﬀect on spending plans [p. 2].”
Two key roles of macroeconomic policies—output stabilization and price level
control—can be achieved by either monetary or ﬁscal policy. Successful regimes that
assign these tasks to either monetary or ﬁscal policy alone, however, require that the
other policy cooperate by playing the appropriate supporting role.
3.2. Role of Expectations. A central tenet of modern economic analysis is that
households and ﬁrms base their decisions, in part, on how they expect economic
conditions to evolve in the future. Because future policies inﬂuence future economic
conditions, economic agents must also form expectations over how policy choices will
evolve. For monetary policy this forward-looking behavior implies that both the
current policy interest rate and the expected path of interest rates indicate the stance
of monetary policy that determines the impacts of policy. As Woodford (2001b) puts
it: “...successful monetary policy is not so much a matter of eﬀective control of
overnight interest rates...as of aﬀecting...the evolution of market expectations....”
Transparency and clear communications are most important when people make
forward-looking decisions. Most central banks now try to include in their communi-
cations with the public some information about the “tilt” or the “risks” to policy,
revealing to some extent where the central bank thinks policy is headed. A hand-
ful of innovative central banks have taken communication about future policy to the
next level. These banks, which include Canada, New Zealand, Norway, and Sweden,
announce what they believe is the most likely path for the policy interest rate over
the forecast horizon.
What’s true about the role of expectations in transmitting the eﬀects of monetary
policy is true in spades about ﬁscal policy. There is substantial evidence that house-
holds and ﬁrms respond to tax changes at the time the changes are announced, which
typically is before the changes are implemented [Poterba (1988, 1989), Steigerwald
and Stuart (1997), Auerbach and Slemrod (1997), Ramey and Shapiro (1998), Ramey
(2007)]. Moreover, economic theory is unambiguous in its predictions: anticipatedANCHORING FISCAL EXPECTATIONS 12
changes in taxes or government spending can have large eﬀects on economic behavior
[Yang (2005), Mertens and Ravn (2008), Leeper, Walker, and Yang (2008, 2009a)].
Some kinds of taxes, such as those on savings, operate entirely through expec-
tations. Consumption-savings decisions are inﬂuenced, not by the current tax rate
on savings, but by the expected tax rate because it is the tax rate in the future
that aﬀects the expected return to saving. Firms’ production and employment deci-
sions depend on anticipated taxes on proﬁts and payrolls. Government infrastructure
spending, which takes time to reach fruition, gets transmitted to the macro economy
through its impacts on expected productivity and anticipated returns to labor and
capital [Leeper, Walker, and Yang (2009b)]. These are examples of how the direct
eﬀects of ﬁscal decisions can operate through expectations.
Expectations also play a key role in determining the indirect eﬀects of ﬁscal actions.
A quantitative sense of the potential importance of expectations in ﬁscal policy can be
gleaned from estimates of ﬁscal eﬀects in the United States taken from Leeper, Plante,
and Traum (2009). These estimates come from a neo-classical growth model estimated
on post-war U.S. data. The model includes rich ﬁscal detail, including policy rules for
government spending, lump-sum transfers, and distortionary taxation on labor and
capital income and on consumption expenditures. It also allows for debt dynamics,
so spending increases or tax cuts are ﬁnanced initially by selling government debt.
Both the timing and the sources of ﬁscal adjustments that eventually retire debt back
to its initial level are determined by historical experience.
Figure 4 reports conventional impact multipliers that report the dynamic eﬀects
of an initial $1 increase in government spending on GDP. The top left panel is the
best ﬁtting model in Leeper, Plante, and Traum (2009) in which all ﬁscal instruments
adjust to ﬁnance increases in government debt. In the short run output rises by about
$0.65, and then smoothly declines, with essentially no eﬀect after about 5 years. The
remaining panels of the ﬁgure report the eﬀects under counterfactual assumptions
about which future instruments will adjust to stabilize debt. When only lump-sum
transfers are cut in the future (top right panel), the output multipliers are uniformly
larger. If future government spending is cut (bottom left panel), the multiplier turns
negative after about 2 years and reaches a trough at −$0.20. But when future capital
and labor taxes are expected to rise (bottom right panel), the multiplier becomes
negative in a little more than a year and then falls to −$0.50. This ﬁgure emphasizes
that because dynamics play such a central role in transmitting ﬁscal policy, ﬁscal
eﬀects in the short run can diﬀer dramatically from long run eﬀects.
Diﬀerences among ﬁscal ﬁnancing schemes emerge because forward-looking eco-
nomic decision makers understand the nature of the ﬁscal rules in place and adjust
their behavior accordingly. Although future ﬁscal ﬁnancing considerations are indi-
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stimulus engineered by increasing government spending. As the bottom two panels
of the ﬁgure make clear, the stimulus may be short lived and even counterproductive
if people believe that future government spending will be cut or future taxes will be
raised.
With an estimated model of ﬁscal policy in hand, we can ask: “How long does it
take for present-value balance to occur—that is, for the intertemporal equilibrium
condition in (IEC) to be established—following ﬁscal disturbances that change the
level of government debt outstanding?” The answer from U.S. data is: a very long
time indeed; on the order of 25 to 35 years. Figure 5 answers the closely related
question: “What fraction of a 1-unit change in government debt in quarter t, due to
each of the ﬁve ﬁscal shocks, is ﬁnanced by period t + K, where K is determined by
the quarters on the x-axis?” This is really about the discrepancy between the two
sides of (IEC) when the left side changes by 1 unit and the right side is truncated K
periods into the future. Regardless of the ﬁscal shock, the discrepancy widens in the
short run before the gap begins to close. The gap closes faster for some shocks than
for others and in all cases, the gap is still substantial even 10 years after the initial
change in ﬁscal policy.14
Figures 4 and 5 underscore three points about ﬁscal policy dynamics. First, ﬁscal
eﬀects depend strongly on expected future ﬁnancing; even the signs of government
spending multipliers can change under alternative ﬁnancing schemes. Second, ﬁscal
dynamics are long lived, extending many decades into the future. Third, ﬁscal impacts
can change dramatically over time, so the total eﬀect of a ﬁscal stimulus may be quite
diﬀerent from the initial eﬀect. Each of these points connects explicitly to the role
that expectations play in transmitting ﬁscal policy.
3.3. Ensuring Government Solvency. Either monetary or ﬁscal policy can ensure
that the government is solvent, as touched on in section 3.1. Conventional wisdom has
increases in government debt backed by some combination of higher future taxes and
lower future government expenditures; these are the adjustments that occur in ﬁgures
4 and 5. “Passive” ﬁscal policy, which delivers this backing, is the most prevalent
maintained assumption about ﬁscal behavior.15
But as the equilibrium condition (IEC) makes clear, other adjustments can occur
to establish equilibrium. Here I mention three potential adjustments. First, Sargent
14Leeper, Plante, and Traum (2009) show through alternative counterfactual exercises that accel-
erating or decelerating ﬁscal adjustments—so the gap closes faster or slower—can have important
consequences for the impacts of ﬁscal policy.
15Passive ﬁscal policy does not preclude periodic episodes in which ﬁscal instruments to not adjust
to debt, so that debt grows rapidly for some time. But bond holders must believe that eventually
the adjustments will occur. Davig (2005) applies this reasoning in his tests of the sustainability of
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and Wallace (1981) study an environment in which government debt is indexed to
inﬂation, there is a threshold level of government debt that the public is willing
to hold, and taxes and expenditures are unresponsive to the state of government
debt. Government rolls over debt until it reaches the threshold beyond which people
are unwilling to absorb new debt issuances. At this point the only option available
to ensure solvency is to print money to generate seigniorage revenues, as countries
did during the hyperinﬂations discussed in section 2.1. This raises the seigniorage
component of net surpluses on the right side of (IEC). Sargent and Wallace’s point
is that in such an environment the central bank loses control of inﬂation because the
required inﬂation tax is driven by ﬁscal considerations.
A second set of adjustments that ensure solvency can arise when government issues
nominal debt, rather than indexed, or real, debt. With outstanding nominal debt,
the stage is set for the ﬁscal theory to operate, as section 3.1 describes. Debt can
be revalued by changes in the price level that guarantee equality holds in expression
(IEC). Once again, as the quotation from Sims (2008) in section 3.1 emphasizes,
monetary policy loses control of the price level. Fiscal theory adjustments have no
necessary connection to the seigniorage mechanism that Sargent and Wallace (1981)
emphasize, although some authors have linked the two mechanisms [King (1995)].
Whereas seigniorage ﬁnancing typically implies persistently higher money growth
and inﬂation, the ﬁscal theory mechanism is more subtle and diﬃcult to detect in
data.
In all the potential adjustments just discussed—ﬁscal instruments, money creation,
and price-level changes—the maintained assumption is that the government cannot
default outright on its debt obligations.16 This assumption is at odds with how
ﬁnancial markets operate in practice, a fact into which treasuries and ministries of
ﬁnance around the world are well tuned.
Fears of sovereign debt default in several countries have arisen during the recent
global recession. In July 2009 Irish government debt was downgraded to AA and
its risk premium over German bonds was nearly 3 percentage points. In May even
the venerable United Kingdom had its sovereign bond rating placed on “negative
watch” in response to forecasts that government debt as a share of GDP will reach
100 percent and remain there for the medium run.
More generally, countries are frequently penalized with risk premia when their
macroeconomic fundamentals or their ﬁscal policies raise concerns about the riskiness
of their government debt [Bi (2009)]. New Zealand government debt was downgraded
from AAA to AA- over the period from 1983 to 1991 when net government debt grew
to a peak of a bit over 50 percent of GDP. Because risk premia are costly, making debt
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service consume a larger fraction of government expenditures, New Zealand adopted
the ﬁscal reforms discussed above in section 2.2.2.
Even in the face of default risk and concerns about a country’s ﬁscal soundness,
the intertemporal equilibrium condition, (IEC), continues to hold. Risk premia serve
to reduce the value of outstanding debt, reducing the left side of (IEC) to line up
with expected future surpluses.
Taken literally, government “insolvency” means that a government’s debt obliga-
tions exceed its ability to back the obligation: the left side of (IEC) exceeds the right
side. But such an outcome is diﬃcult to rationalize in an economy with well-informed
and forward-looking investors because the (IEC) is a condition of economic equilib-
rium. So long as there is some positive price that investors are willing to pay for a
government’s debt, (IEC) must hold and the government is not insolvent.
Equilibrium condition (IEC) shifts the focus from “solvency” to the notion of “risk-
free” policy. As Bi (2009) shows formally, risk-free policies ensure that in the face of
shocks to economic fundamentals, the probability is negligible that an economy will
reach its ﬁscal limit and investors will demand a risk premium to hold the govern-
ment’s bonds.17
Monetary and ﬁscal policy both play a role in delivering risk-free policies that keep
government debt at a level where (IEC) can be satisﬁed without investors building in
a risk penalty.
3.4. Most Eﬀective When Transparent. Transparency of policy has been in-
terpreted by ﬁscal authorities as referring to tracking how tax revenues get spent,
achieving “value for money” from government programs, following accepted account-
ing standards, and conducting policy in an open and public way. These laudable goals
have been codiﬁed by the International Monetary Fund [International Monetary Fund
(2007a,b). But these goals are really the minimal standards that a democratic society
should expect from its government.
Central banks have pushed transparency to a higher plane. They take for granted
that their decisions—both policy and non-policy—will be scrutinized by legislators,
economists, and the public. This intense scrutiny has led the most transparent central
17Bi (2009) distinguishes between the “natural ﬁscal limit” and the “maximum level of debt.”
A natural limit corresponds to the maximum tax revenues an economy can raise—the peak of the
Laﬀer curves—when the (IEC) reﬂects the present value over the inﬁnite future. Maximum level of
debt is designed to reﬂect the populace’s tolerance for government debt accumulation. It is derived
by setting tax rates at the leak of the Laﬀer curve, but truncating the present value at some ﬁnite
period to reﬂect a concern about policy only over the “foreseeable” future, rather than the inﬁnite
future. Bi interprets this lower debt threshold as the maximum level of debt an economy is able to
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banks to reveal to the public in written documents, public speeches, and news confer-
ences three key aspects of their decision making processes: the objectives of monetary
policy and the means by which the central bank tries to achieve the objectives; the
central bank’s views of the current state of the economy, including its understanding
of the sources of shocks to the economy in the recent past; the central bank’s fore-
casts of important economic variables, including at least some discussion of where
future policy is likely to head. In sum, a transparent central bank communicates to
the public whatever information it possesses that will help the public form its views
about current and future states of the economy, which includes policy choices.
Using central banks as the model sets the transparency bar quite high for ﬁscal
authorities. It also fundamentally redeﬁnes “transparency.” To central banks, trans-
parency is a means to the end of enhancing the eﬀectiveness of monetary policy. By
informing the public about the “hows” and the “whys” of monetary policy choices,
eﬀorts at transparency are designed to anchor the public’s expectations of policy and
of the targets of policy. In principle, transparency also reduces macroeconomic uncer-
tainty by taking some of the guesswork out of policy intentions. Transparency, then,
is a monetary policy tool that makes the central bank’s other tools work better.
Fiscal transparency, as it is typically perceived, is less about the “hows” and “whys”
of tax and spending decisions and more about establishing the integrity of and in-
stilling trust in the ﬁscal policy process. With only a few minor exceptions, eﬀorts
at ﬁscal transparency do little to anchor expectations of future policy choices and,
therefore, may not directly improve ﬁscal policy’s eﬃcacy.
Figure 4 illustrates that whether a government spending stimulus will successfully
stimulate depends on how the public believes policy will adjust in the future to ﬁnance
the higher spending. If the ﬁscal authority anticipates the new debt will be ﬁnanced
as debt has been historically (upper left panel), but the public believes future taxes
will rise (lower right panel), the ﬁscal initiative could fail to stimulate the economy
and could even cause output to contract sharply within a short time. When the
public’s expectations of ﬁscal ﬁnancing are not aligned with the policy authority’s,
the impacts of ﬁscal actions become less predictable and, as the ﬁgure illustrates,
can be counterproductive. This example highlights why it may be desirable for ﬁscal
authorities to think about transparency as central banks do: anchoring expectations
by providing information about what policies might occur in the future.
4. Fiscal Transparency and Predictability
For many reasons it is not an easy task to enhance ﬁscal transparency by providing
information that helps to anchor expectations of future ﬁscal choices. The two most
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(1) Fiscal policy is complex;
(2) Current governments cannot commit future governments.
These reasons are true. But they also underscore why enhanced ﬁscal transparency
is potentially so valuable.
4.1. Complexity. Whereas in normal times the central bank conducts routine mone-
tary policy by setting one or two instruments—an overnight interest rate and possibly
a rate at which commercial banks can borrow from the central bank—the ﬁscal au-
thority routinely sets a seemingly endless array of instruments.18 There is a long list
of tax rates on various sources of income and types of consumption and investment
expenditures. Tax codes can be enormously complicated and imply highly non-linear
tax functions. Government spending falls on a large variety of goods and services
with diﬀerent characteristics and potentially diﬀerent impacts on the macro econ-
omy. Taxes and transfer payments aﬀect income distribution and can have profound
eﬀects on economic incentives.
Fiscal decisions are taken by many actors with many motives. Political factions
arise in response to some issues and dissolve in response to others. Lobbyists and
groups representing small constituencies can have disproportionate inﬂuence on ﬁscal
outcomes. Fiscal decisions, which are taken in the political realm, can be diﬃcult for
the public to understand, much less forecast.
Further complicating the ﬁscal decision process is a stunning fact: a clearly de-
ﬁned and attainable set of objectives for ﬁscal policy is rarely speciﬁed. Many ﬁscal
authorities lay out their objectives on their web pages. Sustainable ﬁscal policy is
the most common goal. But achieving sustainable policy is equivalent to aiming to
avoid government insolvency. If a company’s CEO were to announce to shareholders
that the company’s overarching goal is to avoid bankruptcy, the CEO would soon be
replaced. Surely people can ask for more than minimal competence from their public
oﬃcials.
Treasuries and ministries of ﬁnance, of course, do list objectives in addition to
achieving sustainable policies. In fact, they tend to list many objectives to which
they do not attach weights and whose internal compatibility is not discussed. Here
is a sampling of objectives gleaned from the web pages of ﬁscal authorities in Aus-
tralia, New Zealand, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States:19 achieve
18In response to the current recession, central banks have pursued a number of non-standard
policies, which have greatly expanded the eﬀective number of instruments. But this has been a
reaction to highly unusual circumstances, so presumably when times return to normal, central banks
will go back to manipulating their usual instruments.
19Sources include Australian Treasury (2008), New Zealand Treasury (2003), Government Oﬃces
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high and sustainable economic growth; improve living standards; promote a sound
macroeconomic environment; reduce labor market exclusions; strengthen national se-
curity; encourage global economic growth; predict and prevent economic and ﬁnancial
crises; raise productivity; deliver conditions for business success; maximize employ-
ment opportunity; combat climate change; reduce poverty at home and abroad; equal-
ize income distribution; support low inﬂation; build infrastructure; reduce smoking;
minimize deadweight losses. The list could go on. In contrast, central banks in those
same countries list their objectives as: maintain price stability; maintain full employ-
ment; ensure the safety and soundness of the ﬁnancial system; promote moderate
long-term interest rates; supply legal tender. This contrast highlights one reason that
it is diﬃcult for ﬁscal authorities to communicate about their future intentions: when
ﬁscal objectives are diﬀuse and not prioritized, the public’s expectations of ﬁscal
actions will be equally diﬀuse and ill formed.
There is no disputing the complexity of ﬁscal policy. But complexity argues for more
transparency, not less. The more ways that ﬁscal initiatives insinuate themselves into
the public’s decisions and the macro economy, the greater is the need for government
to communicate with the public about the precise range of initiatives and their likely
impacts. Fiscal complexity as an argument against enhanced transparency is a red
herring.
4.2. Inability to Precommit. The second major stumbling block to improved ﬁscal
transparency stems from the well known problem of the time inconsistency of gov-
ernment plans and has been invoked as a rationale for policymakers to follow rules,
rather than apply discretion to their policymaking [Kydland and Prescott (1977)].
Mankiw (2006) clearly explains the problem:
“In some situations policymakers may want to announce in advance
the policy they will follow to inﬂuence the expectations of private de-
cisionmakers. But later, after the private decisionmakers have acted
on the basis of their expectations, these policymakers may be tempted
to renege on their announcement. Understanding that policymakers
may be inconsistent over time, private decisionmakers are led to dis-
trust policy announcements. In this situation, to make their announce-
ments credible, policymakers may want to make a commitment to a
ﬁxed policy rule.”
Time inconsistency applies to monetary policy, but it has been consciously at-
tenuated by various institutional arrangements, such as a clearly stated objective
like inﬂation targeting and other features that insulate central bankers from politi-
cal pressures that might induce monetary policymakers to renege on their previously
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Fiscal policy is rife with sources of time inconsistency. Fiscal actions that operate
directly through expectations formation, by their nature, change future states of the
economy, which can trigger future policy shifts. Elected governments are often short
lived and have no mechanism to force future governments to follow through on earlier
promises.20 Short-lived governments can also be short sighted and pursue policies
that leave ﬁscal messes, which future governments must clean up.
Some countries have made progress toward dealing with time inconsistency prob-
lems by adopting targets or rules for ﬁscal variables. Sweden imposes a nominal limit
on government spending and it aims for a ﬁscal surplus of 1 percent of GDP. New
Zealand has an informal net debt target of 20 percent of GDP. Members of the Euro
Area are expected to obey the limits set by the Growth and Stability Pact—total an-
nual deﬁcits may not exceed 3 percent of GDP and debt may not exceed 60 percent of
GDP. The United Kingdom follows a “Code for Fiscal Stability” that usefully distin-
guishes between current account and capital account expenditures and then applies
the golden rule, which requires current account budgets to be balanced over the busi-
ness cycle. Since the mid-1980s the United States has ﬂirted with a variety of eﬀorts
to reign in ﬁscal deﬁcits—ranging from Gramm-Rudman-Hollings to PAYGO. All of
these measures were adopted more for reasons of sustainability than for transparency;
they are ways of ensuring that ﬁscal policy does not get too out of whack.
To a limited degree, the rules may contribute to transparency. If government debt
is currently above its target level—and the target is credible—then the public knows
that in the future taxes must rise or spending must fall. This information helps
expectations formation by eliminating some possible beliefs; for example, high debt
will not be permitted to persist or to rise still more. Unfortunately, experience does
not inspire conﬁdence in the credibility of existing rules. When France and Germany
violated the Growth and Stability Pact, the pact was watered down. Creative ac-
counting or exemption of bills has allowed the U.S. Congress to circumvent every
eﬀort to impose ﬁscal discipline.
More generally, existing rules may be suﬃcient to deliver sustainability, but they
are only necessary for achieving transparency. Rules that contribute importantly to
transparency need to deal with the speciﬁcs of how sustainability is to be assured—
which taxes and what spending will adjust and when will they adjust—and why the
government is opting for the speciﬁed adjustments. Governments are far from provid-
ing this kind of information, which will help the public form reasonable expectations
of future policies.
The argument that governments cannot precommit to future policies applies with
equal force to the types of ﬁscal rules that countries have already adopted as it does to
20These issues arose in the debate that led to passage of New Zealand’s Fiscal Responsibility Act
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the kinds of details that will help to guide the public’s beliefs. Inability to precommit
has also been raised by opponents to central bank moves to announce forward tracks
for the policy interest rate. Experience in countries that announce tracks suggests
that policy observers understand that the tracks are not commitments; they are
state-contingent indications of where monetary policy is headed, which do not bind
future decisions [Archer (2004)]. But the act of announcing a track imposes discipline
on central bankers and forces them to think dynamically about their policy choices.
Evidence also suggests that announced tracks help guide ﬁnancial market expectations
of interest rates.
Identical reasoning applies to ﬁscal policy. Regardless of how much information the
ﬁscal authority supplies to the public, people are going to form expectations of future
taxes and spending. Those expectations can be informed by the policymakers who
choose ﬁscal variables or they can be diﬀuse, drawn solely from historical evidence
or other source of information, such as talk radio. Fiscal authorities who fail to oﬀer
information that anchors expectations run the risk that ﬁgure 4 illustrates: ﬁscal
initiatives can have unintended consequences.
5. Transparency Going Forward
Until the current global recession hit, many countries’ ﬁscal positions were improv-
ing. Figure 6 shows that in Australia, New Zealand, and the United States the past
two decades had seen steady declines in government debt as a share of GDP. New
Zealand’s net debt fell from a peak of over 50 percent in the early 1990s—when the
debt was also downgraded by bond-rating agencies and interest rates on debt embed-
ded a risk premium—to under 5 percent before the recession aﬀected the country’s
public ﬁnances.
Declining indebtedness boded well for how these countries would enter a prolonged
period in which their aging populations would impose growing demands on the govern-
ment in the form of old-age pensions and health care. Some countries, like Australia
and New Zealand but unlike the United States, have planned for these inevitable de-
mands by creating superannuation funds [Janssen (2001), Gruen and Sayegh (2005)].21
The current economic downturn may disturb those plans by placing countries in a
worse ﬁscal state going forward. In the United States, for example, ﬁscal stimulus
bills, ﬁnancial rescues, and the Obama Administration’s 2009-2010 budget are ex-
pected to double the debt-GDP ratio over the next decade, from 40 percent to 80
percent [Congressional Budget Oﬃce (2009a)].
21Norway’s sovereign wealth fund is another well known example. Sweden’s surplus target of 1
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Figures 7 through 9 show long-term projections of debt-GDP ratios for the United
States, Australia, and New Zealand.22 Fiscal agencies produce such projections
making assumptions about non-discretionary and discretionary spending, economic
growth, inﬂation rates, immigration patterns, and so forth. Importantly, the projec-
tions do not embed assumptions that future surpluses will adjust to stabilize debt.
They also rule out other potential adjustments, including various forms of reneging
on future spending commitments.23 Evidently, ﬁscal issues will remain on the front
burner for many years to come.
What can we learn from such projections? Two things. First, under the maintained
assumptions, debt will grow exponentially in these countries. Second, the maintained
assumptions—which produced the exploding debt paths—cannot possibly hold. We
learn the second point from the intertemporal equilibrium condition. Figure 7 implies
that within our children’s lifetimes, U.S. debt will exceed the ﬁscal limit, violating the
(IEC).24 These projections are public information and well understood by investors
who continue to buy these government bonds without demanding a risk premium.
Why do they continue to buy bonds? Because their expectations of future policy ad-
justments are at odds with the projections’ maintained assumptions. In sum, ﬁgures
of exploding debt paths, which ﬁscal authorities around the world routinely publish,
arise from economic behavior that is not happening and which ﬂies in the face of
basic economic logic.
Having the future inherit larger government debt is problematic for several reasons.
First, higher debt entails higher debt service and more government expenditures must
be devoted to paying interest on outstanding debt. Historically, countries have found
that higher debt service crowds out other forms of government expenditures. Second,
as the intertemporal equilibrium condition, (IEC), implies, higher debt requires higher
present-value surpluses. But that present value is bounded: as a share of GDP, tax
revenues have some maximum level and spending has some minimum level. At those
levels, the natural ﬁscal limit is reached and the economy cannot support a value of
debt higher than that limit. By pushing more debt into the future, current policies
move debt closer to the ﬁscal limit, which places restrictions on ﬁscal ﬂexibility in
22Australian projections are from Australian Treasury (2007), so the short-run outlook does not
reﬂect recent developments. The latest projections from the 2009-2010 budget now have net debt
rising to about 14 percent of GDP by 2012 and remaining positive up to the end of the projection
period, 2019 [Australian Treasury (2009)]. Similarly, New Zealand projections are from New Zealand
Treasury (2006) and the 2009 budget forecasts that gross debt will be over 40 percent of GDP by
2014 [New Zealand Treasury (2009)].
23Reneging could be outright repudiation of the commitment or it could be more subtle. For
example, eligibility ages for pensions could be increased or some beneﬁts could be taxes.
24The U.S. ﬁscal limit is unknown, but I imagine it implies something less than a 300 percent
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the future. But the future is when the ﬁscal consequences of aging populations come
home to roost; it is precisely when ﬁscal ﬂexibility is most needed.
Additional reasons that higher debt is problematic tie back to transparency. Higher
levels of interest payments require larger future ﬁscal adjustments. If the public is
uncertain about the hows and whys of those adjustments, the macroeconomic conse-
quences of the move to higher debt will be diﬃcult to predict. But there is another
more fundamental issue. In countries without guidelines governing debt levels, large
debt run-ups leave unanswered a question that is critical to the public’s formation of
expectations: will the economy settle in at the new, higher level of debt or will policy
endeavor to retire debt back to its previous level or some other level? The answer to
this question is central to the public’s ability to form reasonable ﬁscal expectations.
Many industrialized countries are heading into an extended period of heightened
ﬁscal activity. Transparency will be more important than ever in the face of the
inevitable public debates about how to handle the looming ﬁscal challenges.
6. Steps Toward Fiscal Transparency
To be clear, by ﬁscal “transparency” I mean having the government bring current
and future ﬁscal decisions into the public debate. In this sense, transparency is
really about anchoring ﬁscal expectations and raising the level of discourse about
ﬁscal policy eﬀects and ﬁnancing options. Although for the reasons discussed in
sections 4.1 and 4.2 it is diﬃcult for ﬁscal policy to achieve a degree of transparency
comparable to that in central banks, ﬁscal authorities could nonetheless strive to
achieve it. This section lays out some steps that would enhance the transparency of
ﬁscal policymaking institutions.
6.1. More Sophisticated Projections. Section 5 argues that the long-term pro-
jections in ﬁgures 7 through 9 cannot describe actual outcomes. Are such projections
useful? Some would argue that they are because they make the point that in the
absence of substantive changes in ﬁscal policies, policy is not sustainable. But this
observation alone is of limited utility. First, we hardly need pictures showing that
the debt-GDP ratio could reach 500 percent in 50 years to tell us that current poli-
cies cannot persist. Second, because the ﬁgures depict a scenario that cannot occur,
they do nothing to help the public form expectations about how policies are likely to
change. Third, the process that creates such projections is not suﬃciently dynamic:
“current policy” is an incomplete description of ﬁscal behavior because it ignores the
fact that “future policy” can, and certainly will, be diﬀerent.
Fiscal authorities could produce more sophisticated projections, grounded in eco-
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could occur. A minimal requirement is that the projections ensure that, among other
things, equilibrium condition (IEC) is satisﬁed. Of course, there are many ways that
the equilibrium condition can be made to hold. Transparent projections would then
present a menu of the more interesting and relevant adjustments and show how other
aspects of the macro economy are likely to evolve under each contemplated adjust-
ment. For example, it would be interesting to report the consequences of the types
of ﬁnancing schemes underlying ﬁgure 4. This would force policy discussions to focus
on the economic substance of ﬁscal issues. It could also serve to expose specious ﬁscal
arguments that consist of political rhetoric and are devoid of economic support.
Figure 4, however, depicts a limited class of adjustments because the economic
model behind the ﬁgure assumes that regardless of what happens to government
debt in the short run, eventually it is retired back to its long-run average. Additional
interesting scenarios would examine how outcomes would change if debt were to settle
down at a permanently higher (or lower) level.
6.2. Independent Oversight. Some ﬁscal authorities, following their monetary
brethren, have opened themselves to external scrutiny by establishing ﬁscal pol-
icy councils. Councils’s remits vary from independent ﬁscal authorities (Belgium)
to large government-run agencies that prepare assessments of ﬁscal proposals (the
Netherlands, the United States) to independent “academic” agencies that evaluate
whether the government’s ﬁscal objectives are being achieved (Austria, Denmark,
Sweden).
Kirsanova, Leith, and Wren-Lewis (2006) make an institutional proposal grounded
in economic theory. They argue that optimal ﬁscal policy has debt, rather than tax
rates, act as a shock absorber. To smooth tax distortions, debt follows a random walk,
implying that debt targets produce sub-optimal outcomes.25 They ﬁnd, though, that
the optimal ﬁscal rules are suﬃciently complex as to not be practically implementable.
Instead of advocating those rules, Kirsanova, Leith, and Wren-Lewis propose that
the United Kingdom establish a ﬁscal council that would produce annual long-term
projections and assess sustainability and optimality of the government’s plans. The
council could also publish its preferred adjustments to policy. In Kirsanova, Leith,
and Wren-Lewis’s proposal, a ﬁscal council serves as a surrogate for a ﬁscal policy rule.
Wyplosz (2005, 2008) takes this idea further to advocate the creation of independent
ﬁscal policy committees with more bite. Modeled after central banks, Wyplosz’s
proposal gives the committees the task of achieving debt targets and the authority
to set or recommend deﬁcits.
25The random walk result is sensitive to how the possibility of debt default is handled. Pouzo
(2009) shows that it breaks down in the presence of incomplete markets and endogenous default.
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Even “soft” ﬁscal policy councils like those manned by academic economists can
contribute to ﬁscal transparency by raising the right questions about policy. If current
policies are unsustainable, which set of policies will set things right? What are the
macroeconomic eﬀects of various policies that stabilize debt? Why does the govern-
ment favor one policy over another? Are the government’s guidelines for sustainability
appropriate or too harsh?
It is critical for the council to have a public forum. In Sweden, for example, the
chair of the Swedish Fiscal Policy Council gives annual testimony before the Riksdag
(the parliament) and the council’s annual report is used by the Riksdag to evaluate the
government’s policies [Swedish Fiscal Policy Council (2008, 2009)]. If councils oﬀer
independent and intellectually credible evaluations that receive public attention, the
quality of public discussion of ﬁscal policy will rise well above its current levels.
6.3. Agree on Broad Principles. If ﬁscal authorities were given relatively narrow
objectives, just as many legislatures have done for their monetary authorities, those
objectives would need to be achievable and veriﬁable. This would require arriving at
a political consensus on the goals of government spending and tax programs. To a
large extent, ﬁscal decisions would then be a technical matter, just as many monetary
policy decisions are now.26
I recognize that this is an exceedingly Panglossian perspective. Even small, largely
homogeneous populations would have diﬃculty reaching consensus on the goals of
ﬁscal policy. But perhaps it is possible for elected oﬃcials to reach agreement on
some broad principles of ﬁscal policy. Without advocating them, I can oﬀer some
examples of such principles:
• reduce the complexity of current tax and spending rules;
• raise revenues in the least ineﬃcient manner possible;
• use spending and transfer programs, rather than taxes, to achieve social goals,
such as income redistribution;
• include (or not include) automatic stabilizers in ﬁscal policy rules;
• engage (or not engage) in discretionary countercyclical ﬁscal actions;
• manage government debt to avoid risk premia;
• aim to make ﬁscal policy as transparent as monetary policy;
• talk explicitly about current and future ﬁscal policy options and report likely
economic outcomes of the options;
• produce long-term ﬁscal projections that make economic sense;
• adopt ﬁscal policy rules that are compatible with monetary policy rules;
26This is the aim of the “science of monetary policy,” in Clarida, Gertler, and Gali’s (1999) rather
hopeful phrase. The practice of monetary policy remains—and probably always will be—more than
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• ensure that ﬁscal principles do not conﬂict with monetary policy objectives.
This is intended to be a suggestive, rather than an exhaustive list of ﬁscal principles.
Each society will have its own set of principles on which consensus can be reached.
A well-understood set of principles to guide ﬁscal decisionmaking provides a frame-
work within which the technical analysis of how to design policies that satisfy the
principles can progress.
6.4. Reach Consensus on Rules. Once a broad set of principles has been agreed
on, ﬁscal authorities can develop rules for determining spending and taxation de-
cisions that are consistent with the principles. As discussed, many countries have
jumped to this step without ﬁrst establishing the guiding principles. Rules that en-
force sustainability have been adopted without checking whether those rules conﬂict
with other aims of ﬁscal policy. There is no unique set of ﬁscal rules to ensure pol-
icy is sustainable. But almost certainly some rules for sustainability will prevent
governments from pursuing other objectives such as countercyclical policy. Fiscal
policy is intrinsically a general equilibrium problem and ﬁscal policy design must be
approached from a general equilibrium perspective.
Academic research on ﬁscal policy is at a shockingly nascent stage. The dynamic
consequences of various ﬁscal ﬁnancing schemes have only begun to be explored. Op-
timal ﬁscal policy prescriptions tend to be so sharply at odds with observed policies
that it is diﬃcult to know how seriously the prescriptions should be taken. Economet-
ric models of ﬁscal behavior remain crude and to date there are few micro-founded
models that integrate monetary policy with suﬃcient ﬁscal detail to address prac-
tical questions.27 Recent global macroeconomic developments have made apparent
the shortcomings of existing models, and work is already underway at several central
banks to address those shortcomings.
Answers to fundamental questions about ﬁscal policy still lack professional consen-
sus. There are examples in which countercyclical ﬁscal policies can be unhelpful or
counterproductive [Eser, Leith, and Wren-Lewis (2009), ﬁgure 4, Gordon and Leeper
(2005)], yet the modal view is that automatic stabilizers “quietly do their thing”
[Cohen and Follette (2000), Domenech and Andres (2005), Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe
(2007), Andres, Domenech, and Fatas (2009)]. Most economists contend that govern-
ment debt crowds out private capital, but this conclusion depends on the underlying
source of the debt expansion, the anticipated future adjustments that ﬁnance the
debt, and assumptions about monetary policy behavior [Leeper and Yang (2008),
Davig and Leeper (2009)].
27Though the International Monetary Fund has made progress along these lines with its global
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In contrast, hundreds of papers have been written about rules for monetary policy
that deliver good economic outcomes and are robust to various forms of misspeciﬁ-
cation of the model. Analogous work in models that integrate monetary and ﬁscal
policy can begin to discover implementable rules for ﬁscal policy that produce out-
comes consistent with the ﬁscal principles. Optimal ﬁscal rules are extraordinarily
complex and highly model dependent. Are there robust “simple” rules that can come
close to replicating the outcomes of the optimal ones? Relatively simple ﬁscal rules
can then be used as benchmarks to be compared to actual policy behavior, much as
Taylor’s (1993) rule is used in monetary policy analysis.
Naturally, as with monetary policy, ﬁscal authorities should consider rules that are
explicit about the state-contingent nature of their decisions. Under what conditions
can the public expect taxes to increase? When will discretionary countercyclical
actions take place? What elements will be included in a countercyclical package?
During periods of debt run-ups, how rapidly can people expect policies to adjust to
stabilize debt?
Inevitably, ﬁscal rules will be more complex than monetary rules. Fiscal rules will
need to apply to a large set of instruments and handle a variety of contingencies.
And, of course, ﬁscal decisions ultimately are made in the political arena, rather than
by one or a small handful of technocrats. But if society can agree on ﬁscal principles
and ﬁscal authorities can derive rules consistent with those principles, huge strides
toward transparency and anchoring expectations will have been taken.
6.5. Establishing Credibility. To this point I have used the term “ﬁscal authority”
without distinguishing between the treasury or ministry of ﬁnance and the elected
oﬃcials who propose and vote for spending and tax legislation. All the transparency in
the world will do little to anchor ﬁscal expectations if the actual ﬁscal decisionmakers’
communications about ﬁscal plans are not credible.
How can elected oﬃcials establish credibility? The standard answer is for them
to do as they say and say as they do. True enough. But how can such behavior be
institutionalized to instill it across elected oﬃcials and across time?
Here it is useful to point out an important diﬀerence between monetary and ﬁscal
decisionmakers. Central bankers can be held accountable and earn credibility be-
cause they own their decisions and the economic analyses and projections underlying
those decisions. Central banks around the world employ sizeable staﬀs of professional
economists who produce high-quality research that ﬁnds its way into board rooms,
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central banks publish the econometric models they use in their routine policy anal-
ysis.28 Some banks even include in their public reports explicit references to results
from their models [for example, Sveriges Riksbank (2007)]. By devoting substantial
resources to the analyses behind their policy choices and then exposing the analyses
to the public, monetary policymakers consciously take ownership both of their de-
cisions and their economic rationales. Recognizing that there may also be grounds
for dissenting views well grounded in economic reasoning, some central banks also
publish the minutes of their meetings [for example, Sveriges Riksbank (2009)].
Nothing comparable occurs with ﬁscal policy. Fiscal decisionmakers do own their
votes and they can be held accountable for those votes at election time. But ﬁscal
decisions are only a small subset of the votes that legislators place, so ﬁscal votes can
easily get lost in the morass of electoral politics. More importantly, even if legisla-
tors own their ﬁscal decisions, they rarely own the economic analysis underlying the
decisions. In fact, as an institutional matter, legislators tend consciously to distance
themselves from the nitty gritty economic details. Instead, ﬁscal decisionmakers farm
out the analysis and forecasting to autonomous or semi-autonomous agencies, which
ensures that decisionmakers do not have to ascribe to any particular analysis or set
of projections.
Legislators could adopt procedures similar to those as central banks. Political
coalitions could employ economists whose models and forecasts would be public and
subjected to independent professional scrutiny. Each legislator’s vote and underlying
economic rationale would be recorded and made public. Because coherent economic
analyses would be dynamic and satisfy the intertemporal equilibrium condition, they
would necessarily embed assumptions about both current and future policies. By
owning a ﬁscal projection, decisionmakers would also be revealing their views about
likely and desirable future policy adjustments. Future decisionmakers, of course,
would not be bound by these views. But the act of revealing the views also brings
them into sharp focus and into the public discourse about ﬁscal options. In this way,
the discourse about ﬁscal decisions can also help to guide the public’s expectations
about future policies.
7. Concluding Remarks
I shall end with an egregious example of non-transparent ﬁscal policy: the recent
$787 billion American ﬁscal stimulus plan. Leading up to the introduction and passage
of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, the entire economic rationale for the
28Examples include Poloz, Rose, and Tetlow (1994), Brayton and Tinsley (1996), Smets and
Wouters (2003), Reserve Bank of New Zealand (2004), Harrison, Nikolov, Quinn, Ramsey, Scott,
and Thomas (2005), Adolfson, Laseen, Linde, and Villani (2007).ANCHORING FISCAL EXPECTATIONS 28
stimulus package consisted of the job creation prediction in a document by Romer and
Bernstein (2009).29 An appendix to the document reports multipliers for a permanent
increase in government spending and decrease in taxes of 1 percent of GDP. Four years
after the initial stimulus, government purchases raise GDP by 1.55 percent, while tax
cuts raise GDP by 0.98 percent. Sources for these numbers are reported as the Federal
Reserve’s FRB/US model and “a leading private forecast ﬁrm.”
To assess how this rationale for stimulus measures up in terms of transparency, I
raise some questions that are not addressed in the Romer-Bernstein document, but
are important for anchoring ﬁscal expectations:
• What are the economic models underlying the multiplier numbers and are
those numbers reproducible?
• Why consider permanent changes in ﬁscal variables when the Act makes tran-
sitory changes?
• What are the consequences of the stimulus for government debt?
• What are the repercussions of signiﬁcantly higher government debt?
• Will the debt run-up be sustained or retired?
• How will policies adjust in the future to either sustain or retire the debt?
Some might accuse me of ﬁnding a straw man to ridicule. But this is an important
example because of its potential impact on the world economy. At over 5 percent
of U.S. GDP, this is the world’s largest stimulus in response to the current recession
[International Monetary Fund (2009)], and that ﬁgure does not include the 2008 tax
rebate or the substantial ﬁnancial rescue packages.
Some might also argue that the United States is a bad example because it has
among the least transparent ﬁscal policies. I grant that. But measured against the
bulleted items above, few ﬁscal authorities would emerge looking very transparent.
Principles, guidelines, rules, and independent oversight may help to improve the
transparency and eﬃcacy of ﬁscal policy by nailing down the private sector’s expec-
tations. Or they can provide a smoke screen behind which ﬁscal shenanigans can
proceed as usual.
To be successful, ﬁscal principles need to reduce the complexity of ﬁscal policy. This
can be accomplished at the implementation stage when the principles are transformed
into quantiﬁable rules governing ﬁscal decisions. It may be necessary to provide
statutory or even constitutional protections for the rules. Rules that are adopted in
a frenzy are likely to be ill-conceived and can easily have deleterious eﬀects.
29A follow-up report in May 2009 contains further predictions [Council of Economic Advisors
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Research has not yet quantiﬁed the social costs of the uncertainty about ﬁscal
policy that non-transparent policies engender. Neither has research explored the
possible consequences of unanchored ﬁscal expectations. Both of these issues need to
be understood.
But some things are certain. Fiscal policy is too important to be left to the vagaries
of the political process. Reform of ﬁscal institutions, the design of ﬁscal rules, and
ﬁscal decisions can be informed and guided to a much larger extent by careful eco-
nomic analysis. Failure to achieve appropriate ﬁscal reforms threatens to undermine
the progress made on monetary policy and, in the face of the looming heightened
















Figure 1. The price level in Germany during the interwar era. Verti-












Figure 2. Inﬂation rates in selected countries. Vertical scale is annual
percentage points. Source: OECD Economic Outlook, various issues,
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Figure 3. Output growth rates in selected countries. Vertical scale is
annual percentage points. Source: OECD Economic Outlook, various
issues, and Reserve Bank of New Zealand.ANCHORING FISCAL EXPECTATIONS 33





























Only Government Spending Adjusts











spending ⇒ $0.65 more
GDP
Spending financed only
by higher future taxes ⇒
GDP soon declines
Spending financed only by
lower future spending ⇒
GDP falls after 2 years
Spending financed only by
lower future transfers ⇒
GDP rises more
Figure 4. Government spending impact multipliers for output under
alternative assumptions about ﬁscal ﬁnancing. Top left panel is the
best ﬁtting model in Leeper, Plante, and Traum (2009) in which all ﬁs-
cal instruments adjust to ﬁnance increase in government debt; top right
panel only lump-sum transfers adjust; bottom left panel only govern-
ment spending adjusts; bottom right panel only capital and labor taxes
adjust. Vertical scale is dollars of output following an initial increase
in government spending of $1. Source: Leeper, Plante, and Traum
(2009).ANCHORING FISCAL EXPECTATIONS 34





















Figure 5. Government debt funding horizons for each of ﬁve ﬁscal
shocks—labor taxes, consumption taxes, capital taxes, transfer pay-
ments, government spending—using the mean estimates of posterior
draws from the model best ﬁtting model in Leeper, Plante, and Traum
(2009) where all ﬁscal instruments adjust to debt. The ﬁgure can an-
swer the question, “What fraction on a 1-unit innovation in government
debt in quarter t, due to each of the ﬁve ﬁscal shocks, is ﬁnanced by
period t + K, where K is determined by the quarters on the x-axis?”
The x-axis units are quarters. Source: Leeper, Plante, and Traum





























Figure 6. Net government debt as a percentage of GDP in Australia,
New Zealand, and the United States. Source: OECD Economic Out-






























Figure 7. Long-term projection of government debt as a percentage
of GDP in the United States. Baseline scenario assumes current law
remains in place; alternative scenario incorporates some policy changes
that are widely expected to occur. Source: Congressional Budget Oﬃce





























Figure 8. Long-term projection of net government debt as a percent-






























Figure 9. Long-term projection of gross sovereign-issued debt as a
percentage of GDP in New Zealand. Source: New Zealand Treasury
(2006).ANCHORING FISCAL EXPECTATIONS 39
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